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I'd like to  talk about some ideas on Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT): 
0 
0 
Why we at Eastern chose t h a t  program as a training tool; 
How we've developed our program; 
0 What it has done f o r  us so f a r  at Eastern Air Lines, and; 
0 What uses we plan f o r  it in t h e  future. 
The  environment in which w e  opera te  continues to become more  demanding of 
management  skills on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  pilot conducting t h e  flight. This is directly 
re la ted to t h e  complexity of a n  operation intended to a t ta in  absolute safety 
while conducting all weather  flight. W e  recognize t h e  need to shift f rom training 
in manipulative skills to something closer to management  skills. 
Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is n o t  a new idea. W e  used a similar 
format  at Eastern in t h e  late 1950's on our DC-8 and Boeing 720 ser ies  a i rcraf t .  
A t  t h a t  t ime, t h e  simulators available had no motion, nor visual capabilities. As 
a result, we were  unable, until recently, to develop a training environment t h a t  
would simulate t h e  real world with acceptable  fidelity. W e  needed to i l lustrate  
t h e  value of standard operating procedures as they a f f e c t  t h e  l ine pilot in 
everyday operation. The  advent  of simulators with motion, plus t h e  visual 
system ability to  reproduce a realist ic a i rport  scene, provided us with t h e  tools 
w e  needed to construct a worthwhile line-oriented fl ight training program. 
Our f i r s t  e f f o r t  to implement  LOFT was a scenario w e  developed in 1975, 
wherein t h e  c rew took a three-leg, four-hour fl ight t h a t  satisfied all require- 
ments  of Appendix F, except  for  s teep  turns  and approaches to stall. By t h e  end 
of t h e  four-hour period, t h e  c rew had seen a major faul t  in every system on  t h e  
aircraft .  They conducted at least two ILS approaches and  two non-precision 
instrument approaches p e r  pilot. Most, i f  n o t  all, of t h e  emergency procedures 
had been reviewed. 
To accommodate  all this  activity,  t h e  legs between t h e  ci ty  pairs used in t h e  
scenario were  shortened electronically. Shortly a f t e r  this  time, Eastern applied 
for,  but  was not  granted, permission to  opera te  under a n  exemption from 
Appendix F. Appendix F lists t h e  requirements f o r  t h e  demonstration of 
competency as outlined by t h e  Federal  Aviation Administrator. In fairness to t h e  
Administrator, I mus t  point out t h a t  this regulation is intended to accommodate  
all operators  under Part 121, including those car r ie rs  who may n o t  have t h e  most  
modern training devices. 
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Since ours was a special case, we f e l t  t h a t  s t r ic t  compliance with t h e  regulation 
would not  provide t h e  flexibility needed to shif t  emphasis from training in "man- 
ipulative skillsI1 to  training in management  skills. W e  were  unable to obtain t h e  
exemption and  LOFT was put  aside for a time. 
Our cur ren t  format  was developed a f t e r  guidelines for  exemption were  published, 
and  we found t h a t  we were  not  required to conform to Appendix F at a l l  - except  
t h a t  we must  maintain our landing cer t i f icat ion to Category I1 o r  Category IIIa 
minimums. This was no real  d e t e r r e n t  s ince our visual systems a r e  capable of 
visibility reductions, to whatever degree is required. If individual performance 
indicated a need for  remedial training in normal VFR approach and landings, this  
could be completed as a n  add-on to t h e  LOFT session.. Right now we have two 
programs in operation, both approved by t h e  Federal  Aviation Agency (FAA). 
One  is for  t h e  Boeing 727 aircraf t ,  t h e  o ther  f o r  t h e  Douglas DC-9. LOFT 
programs f o r  t h e  Lockheed L-1011 and t h e  A300 a r e  being developed now. W e  
expect  to have these programs approved by t h e  end of 1979. 
Our present  program consists of six scenarios per  a i rc raf t  type. Each scenario 
contains t h r e e  legs. T h e  scenarios a r e  designed to f i t  within t h e  four-hour t ime 
f r a m e  ordinarily used for a training period. 
When we develop our programs, we emphasize s t r ic t  realism. All t h e  legs are 
flown in real  time. The problems presented f o r  t h e  c rews  to  solve a r e  those 
which can, and in some cases, have happened in real  a i rcraf t .  The  visual systems 
c a n  construct t h e  airport  environment with considerable fidelity. T h e  picture  
t h e  pilot sees on approach to a runway in our simulator is amazingly close to  
what  h e  would see in t h e  real  world. These visual breakthroughs add 
immeasurably t o  t h e  flight crew's acceptance  of LOFT, and  therefore,  enhance 
our program's value materially. 
When we began to c r e a t e  scenarios, we needed to consider some key items: 
1. What route  segments  and  airports  should we use which would give t h e  best  
indication of t h e  Captain's management  skill? The approach briefing, 
individual task assignments, c r e w  coordination and  t h e  command presence 
were  some of t h e  i t e m s  w e  considered. For  example, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, gives us a chance  to work on  Category 11. I t  a lso affords us 
t h e  opportunity to  use a n  inner marker  for  decision height ra ther  t h a n  a 
radio alt imeter.  
The  VOR approach to Runways 5 o r  36 in Charlotte,  North Carolina, 
compels t h e  fl ight c rew to  make a n  approach to what is commonly known 
as a "black hole" type a i rpor t  - which is to say, there  a r e  no  per imeter  
l ights to rely on f o r  a t t i t u d e  judgment. T h e  only things you see when you 
break out  a r e  t h e  runway lights and  those l ights adjacent  to t h e  terminal. 
So, we chose Char lo t te  to i l lustrate  t h a t  particular problem at night. 
Operations in and  out of Atlanta, Georgia, g a v e  us a chance  to opera te  in a 
complex air t ra f f ic  control environment, and  another  try at Category I1 
approaches as well. 
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W e  chose Miami, Florida, because .of the v of approaches available in 
generally VFR weather. Previous experi in upgrade training from 
Second Officer (Flight Engineer) to  First Officer (Co-Pilot) has indicated a 
need for training in approach and landing based on visual perception rather 
than electronic guidance. 
2. What aircraft systems and procedures should we examine and where should 
we put them in the scenario to  ensure the highest degree of realism? For 
instance, current emphasis is being placed on the use of maximum braking 
in the  event of a rejected takeoff. This is the result of industry experience 
which indicates that: 
A. The rejected takeoff is more likely to be the result of some 
malfunction, such as a blown tire, or a fire warning indication, rather 
than a failure of the  most critical power plant; and, 
B. Admonitions to the flight crews to go "easy on the brakes" - konsider 
costs" - lldonlt try to  make that first turn-off," have resulted in the use 
of less-than-maximum braking when needed. 
In the scenario, we can consider including the rejected take off, to 
physically demonstrate maximum brake pedal deflection, and the 
effectiveness of ground spoilers and reverse thrust in reducing roll-out 
distance, and by using a n  airport layout in the visual scene, such as 
Washington National, the  results of non-standard operating procedures 
on a rejected takeoff can be dramatically displayed. 
3. Finally, how should we tailor these scenarios to  f i t  the  four-hour time 
frame? 
First, we decided what approaches we would "shoot" into what airports. Then we 
took city pairs and linked them together to form the legs of the  scenarios. W e  
decided, on each leg of each "flight,'* what problems we would present for the 
crews to solve and also, how many problems, and where they should occur. After 
we roughed out our plans, we went to our dispatch department, and drew from 
the computer actual flight plans that  a r e  stored there, selecting those city pairs 
we had chosen. Once we had those plans in hand, we began to f i t  the  segments 
together to form the four-hour training period needed to satisfy our require- 
ments. 
As soon as all six scenarios were composed and all of the legs were laid out, we 
test-flew them in the simulator to be certain that they f i t  within the four-hour 
time frame. W e  allowed adequate time between legs for short breaks for the 
crew. When all of the scenarios were put together, we invited three different 
groups to fly the  scenarios, and we solicited comments from each group. 
First, our simulator flight instructors wete scheduled to fly the scenarios. In 
each case, they were asked to consider: 
EAL flight segment. 
0 Whether the flight plan was realistic and could related to a typical 
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0 Was the routine excessively demanding? and, 
a Could the  expected response by the  crew be indicative of a lack of 
management skills? 
Next, the  Training Committee from ALPA reviewed the scenarios and flew one. 
Since all members of the  committee a re  regular line pilots, we felt that  their 
input as potential users would be significant. 
W e  then invited a group of Air Carrier Inspectors from the FAA to try a scenario 
or  two and give their opinions. W e  felt that  FAA participation at the early stage 
of program development was important. Since they would be the  approving 
authority, we could use their input to help identify any possible problems which 
might delay program approval. Once we had collected all of the ideas, 
comments, and suggestions, we put a final polish on the total package and passed 
it to the FAA for its official approval. 
The training period begins with the  full crew attending for the examination of 
the  flight departure papers. At Eastern Air Lines, all of those flight departure 
papers are stored; tha t  is, dispatch releases, flight plans, fuel requirements, 
weather sequences, and forecasts a r e  all in the  computer and are recalled as 
each crew requires them prior to departure. Since we strive for considerable 
realism in the LOFT program, we also have the flight departure papers for the 
program stored in the  computer, accessible to  us in training. They are recalled 
by the  instructor prior to briefing his crew, before the training sequence. 
As in normal operations, the crew examines the papers for minimum equipment 
items, fuel requirements, notices to  airmen, and so forth. They also check the  
appropriate weather sequences and forecasts, determine fuel requirements, and 
perform any other preparations that a Captain may require. 
When the Captain decides that sufficient time has been spent on briefing, the 
crew proceeds t o  the  simulator. While in the  simulator, the Instructor/Check 
Airman links normal communications among s ta r t  crew, ground control, tower, 
departure control, and so forth. He does not, under any circumstance, interfere 
with normal operation or functioning of the  crew. 
Once under way, the crew must solve all problems according to their own best 
judgment. W e  took great care t o  avoid overloading the scenario. Had we 
cluttered it with unrealistic situations, we might have induced mismanagement. 
But, any of the  crew's mistakes or errors in judgment, or ignorance of 
procedures, will remain until corrected, or until t he  "aircraft" is on the ground. 
The training requirement is for four hours, and all the legs need not be 
completed. 
A word about scripting is appropriate at this time. All sequences are tightly 
scripted, and deviations and additions a re  not permitted, except that  items may 
be deleted i f  there is not enough time in the  four-hour period left to perform 
them. As a timing aid to  the instructor who is conducting the  scenario, we 
designed t h e  last leg with an adjustable time frame. The script is so written that 
the  instructor has the  option of selecting tha t  point at which the  problem will be 
presented which best utilizes the training time remaining. 
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When t h e  simulator period ends, t h e  InstructorlCheck Airman leads t h e  crew's 
debriefing session. 
In t h e  year  and a half since Eastern Air Lines began t h e  LOFT program, we have 
come to see it as t h e  training vehicle of t h e  future. W e  believe tha t  LOFT can  
provide more realistic initial training because, from t h e  f i rs t  day of training, we 
c a n  emphasize t h e  kinds of skills needed to  operate  a particular aircraft  in 
today's complex environment. W e  believe t h a t  LOFT develops considerable 
judgment skills and provides excellent experience in structuring priorities. It 
also illustrates t h e  consequences of poor resource management, ignorance of 
proper procedures, and lack of command presence. 
Training conducted in simulation, very closely matching t h e  environment in 
which t h e  crew normally operates, gives a crew t h e  best  opportunity to see 
normal and abnormal situations and their solutions. For example: in t h e  
simulator, a Category I1 approach to a runway closely approximates what t h e  
pilot will see in t h e  real world. But in a trainer aircraft ,  as soon as you "pop t h e  
hood,'' t h e  pilot finds himself in a n  entirely visual environment. For this reason, 
we feel t h a t  LOFT provides considerably more realism. 
In addition to its value as a training vehicle, a line oriented training program is 
a n  excellent evaluation exercise. The simulator's ability to accurately reproduce 
t h e  line pilot's normal working environment, plus t h e  instructor's briefing prior to 
t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  period, emphasizes to t h e  crew t h a t  they a r e  expected to 
perform in t h e  simulator exactly as they would perform in t h e  real world. This 
permits us to  see a more accura te  picture of how t h e  crew functions in such 
areas  as decision-makin cockpit discipline, t h e  Captain's command presence, 
crew coor nation, a n  other  resource management skills. Th e crew IS also 
briefed that the  LOFT program is not  constructed as a pass or  fail check ride; i t  
is, rather, a n  evaluation of their skills to uncover in what areas, if any, they may 
need additional training. W e  feel  t h a t  it is important to remove any threa t  of 
embarrassment or  punitive action. By so doing, we diminish t h e  tendency of t h e  
crew to respond in t h e  way t h a t  they think t h a t  t h e  instructor wishes them to 
respond, and apply instead their own best  solution. W e  believe t h a t  this 
environment produces a very clear picture of t h e  capabilities of t h e  crew being 
evaluated. 
W e  have found LOFT to  be excellent for remedial training. W e  have taken crews 
off t h e  line who have had a problem of one  kind or  another, put them in a LOFT 
training format  to duplicate t h e  problem o r  circumstances they experienced, and 
l e t  them pinpoint t h e  moment when things go wrong. W e  c a n  show them what 
they did, find out why they did it, and demonstrate t h e  be t te r  way to  do it next  
time. 
As a result of our success with this approach in remedial training, we a r e  now 
experimenting with t h e  construction of modules to  be  stored in t h e  computer. 
Each one  will be  fabricated to illustrate a particular problem or abnormality 
that,  if mishandled, could have serious consequences. 
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When we g e t  a c r e w  requiring remedial work, f o r  whatever reason, we hope to 
retr ieve these modules f rom t h e  computer,  examine them, and  ex t rac t  those 
which, when linked, will result  in a LOFT scenario f o r  t h a t  particular c rew to  
exercise  in. Eventually, we hope to  have enough modules to cover  t h e  majority 
of difficult ies w e  see on  t h e  line. In this  fashion, w e  will tai lor a training 
program, almost  exactly, to f i t  t h e  kind of training required. 
W e  also intend to use LOFT to evaluate  our cur ren t  operational procedures for  
both normal and  abnormal situations, a n d  to help us determine needs for, and  t h e  
effect iveness  of, new procedures. For instance, at Eastern Air Lines, we have no 
wri t ten procedure to  cover c r e w  incapacitation, both subtle and  dramatic. By 
observing t h e  c rews  as they handle these situations, we will 'decide whether o r  
n o t  we should have in writing some procedures f o r  c rew incapacitation, and if so, 
what  they shoud be. 
W e  intend to fur ther  use LOFT to  spot  any trends indicating weak spots  in our 
training program. 
When a l l  of our simulators a r e  approved f o r  t h e  landing maneuver, LOFT will 
make it possible to  complete  all phases of training in t h e  simulator. W e  want  
training programs t h a t  will assure  competency in t h e  a r e a  of manipulative and  
management  skills prior to  assignment to scheduled operations. The  l ine 
operating experience will se rve  to validate t h e  effect iveness  of t h e  training 
program. 
To sum up: Line-Oriented Flight Training, as it has been  developed at Eastern 
Air Lines, represents  t h e  bes t  training vehicle w e  have seen thus far. W e  believe 
it matches all our training needs more than anything y e t  devised. 
W e  shall, of course, use LOFT programs in training, and  f o r  t h e  annual a n d  semi- 
annual proficiency checks. Soon w e  will build i t  in to  initial training. W e  see it 
as a marvelous device f o r  remedial training as well, and  f o r  reviewing t h e  
effect iveness  of operational procedures. As a tool f o r  developing new 
procedures, we have found it to be unequalled. W e  a r e  confident t h a t  LOFT will 
l ead  us to z e r o  a i rc raf t  time. 
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DISCUSSION 
MR. RANDALL, NASA: I a g r e e  wi th  you, t h e  C G I  systems are r e a l l y  
c l a s s y ,  bu t  I ' v e  never seen  a genera t ion  of te rmina l  weather wi th  those  
th ings .  Is i t  done e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  o r  o p t i c a l l y ?  
CAPT. BEACH: No, i t ' s  e l e c t r o n i c .  
MR. RANDALL: Could you d e s c r i b e  how it  looks? 
CAPT. BEACH: The b e s t  d e s c r i p t i o n  I can  g ive  you as t o  how i t  
looks  is  - I ' l l  go back t o  t h e  example I used t o  begin with.  I n  Category 
11, f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  only th ing  t h a t  you do no t  see i n  t h e  v i s u a l  system, 
i f  you ' re  looking a t  fog  a t  t h e  a i r p o r t ,  is t h e  ha lo  around t h e  l i g h t s  - 
we have done everything but  t h a t .  The d i sc r imina t ion  of t h e  runway t e x t u r e ,  
t h e  numbers, t h e  s l i g h t  b l u r r i n g  of the. c e n t e r l i n e ,  a l l  of t h a t ,  touchdown 
zone l i g h t s ,  t h e i r  i n t e n s i t y .  I f  you ' re  no t  c a r e f u l  you t h i n k  you ' re  i n  a 
real a i r p l a n e ,  t h a t ' s  how good it is. The only  th ing  w e  don ' t  have i n  t h e  
v i s u a l  system now i s  the  occu l t ing  of bu i ld ings .  A s  you t a x i  up t o  t h e  
te rmina l ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  a t  Washington Nat ional  A i rpo r t  i n  Washington, D.C. ,  
you can see through t h e  bu i ld ings .  It is only  a s l i g h t  i n f i d e l i t y ,  bu t  i t  
is no t  t oo  dandy and w e ' r e  working on it .  
MR. RANDALL: Do you have t h e  phenomenon of broken clouds - now 
you see i t ,  now you don ' t ?  
CAPT. BEACH: Y e s ,  t h a t  mode is  c a l l e d  scud. I ' m  no t  s u r e  w h a t  
t h e  random occu l t ing  is, bu t  t h e r e  is  a random, patchy fog t h a t  w e  can use.  
A s  a matter of f a c t ,  w e  u s e  i t  f o r  a missed-approach maneuver, now you see 
i t ,  now you don ' t ,  you've go t  t o  go. 
UNIDENTIFIED: How do you handle  a n  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  o r  less- than-  
capable  crewmember? 
CAPT. BEACH: What is done depends e n t i r e l y  on w h a t  t h e  check 
c a p t a i n  f e e l s  is requi red .  Since t h e r e  i s  no pass  o r  f a i l ,  w e  t a k e  t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r ' s  recommendation as t o  what kind of t r a i n i n g  is requi red  t o  b r ing  
t h e  man up t o  our  s tandards ,  how much and i n  what d i r e c t i o n .  W e  r e l y  
completely upon t h e  i n s t r u c t o r  t o  g i v e  us  t h a t  i npu t .  I f  Capt. Jones needs 
a 4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod wi th  emphasis on nonprecis ion approaches,  that's 
what he  g e t s .  Then another  eva lua t ion .  
MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s :  I understand what you ' re  going 
t o  do i n  t h e  next  s t e p ,  bu t  up t o  t h i s  po in t  i n  t i m e  do you use  LOFT a t  a l l  
i n  t h e  s tandard  t r a n s i t i o n  program, and i f  so, how? 
CAPT. BEACH: On J u l y  1 w e  are beginning t o  use  LOFT concepts  t o  
reduce a i r c r a f t  t i m e .  We're doing what r e a l l y  amounts t o  a d r e s s  r e h e a r s a l  
f o r  t h e  type  r a t i n g  r i d e .  It w i l l  be  done i n  our  AST s imula tor ,  and I have 
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cons t ruc ted  a s m a l l  mini-scenario t o  be  used by t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  as a 
d r e s s  r e h e a r s a l .  That ' s  t h e  beginning. I d e a l l y  what I want t o  do, and I 
th ink  w e  w i l l  when w e  have t h e  development-type s imula tor ,  is u s e  l i ne -  
o r i en ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  i n  i n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g .  The f i r s t  s imula tor  per iod o r  
two w i l l  be  devoted t o  systems and procedures,  a f t e r  which i t  begins  t o  be  a 
l i n e  t r i p .  Tha t ' s  next .  
CAPT. SESSA, Allegheny A i r l i n e s :  Af t e r ,  say ,  a p i l o t  r ece ives  
4 hours of emphasis on nonprecis ion approaches,  how is the  reeva lua t ion  
conducted? Is it  under a LOFT b a s i s ,  o r  on a normal prof ic iency  check? 
CAPT. BEACH: On t h e  normal prof ic iency  check, because w e  r e q u i r e  
f o r  a LOFT program a l i n e  crew. Which is  t o  say,  i f  t h e  l i n e  crew is not  
p re sen t ,  w e  c a n ' t  do LOFT. For one th ing ,  t h e  exemption, I th ink ,  p r o h i b i t s  
us  from p u t t i n g  check people  i n  t o  be used as a d d i t i o n a l  crew members. So 
because t h e  crew he went through t h e  LOFT program wi th  is  gone, p lus  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  w e  want t o  focus on h i s  i nd iv idua l  problem, w e  t ake  him a s i d e  and 
plug him i n t o  t h e  ord inary  program. 
MR. COEN, FAA: L e s t  w e  scare some of t hese  o the r  people o f f ,  t he  
r u l e  w a s  changed about 9 months ago t o  a l low f o r  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  under 
Subpart N and 1 2 1 .  So now you have t h e  t h r e e  op t ions  of 409 t r a i n i n g ,  
Appendix E and o the r  p ro f i c i ency  checks f o r  t h e  LOFT t r a i n i n g ,  and i t  s p e l l s  
out  t h e  r egu la t ions .  
CAPT. BEACH: I ' m  no t  e n t i r e l y  s u r e  t h a t  I have seen  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  modi f ica t ion  ac ross  my desk,  but  I ' m  glad t o  hear i t .  
MR. COEN: Anybody who wants t o  can go i n t o  LOFT; we don ' t  want 
t o  s c a r e  you o f f .  
CAPT. HOLDSTOCK, B r i t i s h  Airways: We have gone down t h i s  road, 
and, l i k e  you, I do a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  va lue .  However, f o r  t h e  per iod t h e  f l i g h t  
is  a c t u a l l y  going on t h e r e  is no t r a i n i n g .  
n o t ,  we're checking, we're eva lua t ing .  
t h e  deb r i e f ing .  However, t h e r e  are t i m e s  when a mistake has taken p l ace  
dur ing  t h e  f l i g h t ,  and t h e  one th ing  you need t o  do f o r  t h e  ind iv idua l  i s  t o  
r i g h t  i t ,  then  and the re .  You don ' t  want t o  send him home wi th  t h e  thought 
t h a t  he  d id  something s tup id  o r  w a s  incapable  of f l y i n g  t h e  procedure - 
you want t o  put  i t  r i g h t .  Do you have any f a c i l i t y  i n  t h i s  t r a i n i n g ?  
We c a l l  i t  t r a i n i n g ,  but  we're 
The t r a i n i n g  comes a t  t h e  end wi th  
CAPT. BEACH: We have done perhaps t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  of t h e  same 
co in  you ' re  t a l k i n g  about .  We s p e c i f i c a l l y  do n o t  i n t e r r u p t  t h e  flow of t h e  
f l i g h t  as i t  proceeds.  For example, t h e  DC-9 a i r c r a f t  e lectr ical  f i r e  and 
smoke i s  one of t h e  more f r i g h t e n i n g  th ings  about t h a t  a i r p l a n e .  I f  you 
f i n d  a crew t h a t  simply cannot handle  i t ,  w e  s i t  back and l e t  t h e  th ing  
c rash .  
But once he has  crashed,  i f  t h a t ' s  what t u r n s  ou t  t o  be t h e  case, once t h e  
a i r c r a f t  is back on t h e  ground aga in ,  then by d e b r i e f i n g  immediately 
t h e r e a f t e r  w e  can begin t o  show him what he d i d  wrong. But w e  d o n ' t  
The idea  being w e  want t h e  man t o  d i g  as deep a hole  as he  can d ig .  
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i n t e r f e r e  wi th  th ings  as they are happening. W e  used t o  do t h a t  on what w e  
c a l l e d  t h e  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod i n  l i e u  of a p ro f i c i ency  check. Launch t h e  
a i r c r a f t ,  p re sen t  a problem, put  t h e  s imula t ion  on f r eeze ,  and l e t ' s  t a l k  
about what you've seen  - why d i d  t h i s  happen o r  why d id  t h a t  happen. W e  
crammed a weal th  of information i n t o  t h a t  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod,  and you 
could see it  l e a k  out  of t h e  man as he walked away from t h e  s imula tor .  
W e  f e l t  t h a t  you never l e a r n  b e t t e r  than when you embarrass your se l f ,  
i f  i t  comes t o  t h a t .  Those kinds of t h ings  t h a t  make a dramatic  impression 
on you o r  those  kinds of events  where you could have k i l l e d  your se l f .  So w e  
f e l t  r a t h e r  than,  and w e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  ta lked  about  t h a t  s u b j e c t ,  r a t h e r  
than put  it r i g h t  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  w e ' l l  u s e  t h e  d e b r i e f i n g  f o r  t h a t .  
f e e l  t h a t  w e  have made t h e  man ove r ly  humble, then  w e ' l l  pu t  him back i n  t h e  
machine aga in ,  and l e t  him do i t  r i g h t ,  j u s t  t o  prove t o  himself t h a t  he can. 
I f  w e  
CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Can you t e l l  m e  t o  what ex ten t  you are 
requi red  t o  do a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c  remedial  o r  brush-up-type t r a i n i n g  
fol lowing t h e  LOFT exe rc i se?  Also, how do you f a c e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  
normal course  of a man's l i n e  f l y i n g ,  he does no t  come upon an  engine c u t  
on t a k e o f f ,  he does not  come upon a two-engine approach o r  three-engine missed 
approach. 
and our t r a i n i n g  i n  l i e u  of checks t o  g i v e  him p r a c t i c e  i n  maneuvers t h a t  
w e  f e e l  they need. To g ive  him a smat te r ing  of t h e s e ,  bu t  no t  a l l  of them, 
i n  a LOFT program has caused u s  t o  look  very ,  very  c a r e f u l l y  a t  t h e  concept 
of t h e  LOFT because of t h e  economic e f f e c t  i t  would have. On t h e  one hand, 
i t  would f o r c e  us  t o  double  our t r a i n i n g  i n  o rde r  t o  acccomplish t h e  
p r a c t i c e  p i ece  of t h i s  t h ing ,  y e t  on t h e  o the r  hand it would obviously 
t ake  advantage of t h e  c r e w  concept a s p e c t  and t h e  management a spec t  of LOFT 
i t s e l f .  It would be very  h e l p f u l  t o  u s  i f  you could t e l l  u s  exac t ly  how much 
a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  it w i l l  r e q u i r e  i f  w e  were t o  go t o  t h e  LOFT concept f o r  
our t r a i n i n g  i n  l i e u  of check. 
Y e t  throughout t h e  years  w e  have been us ing  our  p e r i o d i c  checks 
CAPT. BEACH: W e  haven ' t  found a s p e c i f i c  amount of t i m e  requi red .  
Maybe I can address  your ques t ion  by answering t h e  l a s t  ha l f  of i t  f i r s t .  
P a r t  of what you ' re  t a l k i n g  about is  those  kinds of th ings ,  as I mentioned 
'earl ier,  when w e  had t h e  4-hour t r a i n i n g  per iod ,  where he s a w  one each of 
everything t h a t  could poss ib ly  go wrong. 
of t h e  727,  a n  engine-fai led approach, an engine-fai led missed approach, 
double-engine f a i l u r e ,  s ingle-engine landings ,  electrical f i r e  and smoke, 
abnormal i t ies  - a l l  of t h a t  i n  4 hours.  A s  you j u s t  s a i d ,  it doesn ' t  
happen a l l  t h e  time. But maybe he ought t o  see i t  once a yea r ,  a t  least, 
t o  r e f r e s h  h i s  memory on why th ings  happen l i k e  that. Tha t ' s  what w e  used 
t o  do. But w e  f e l t ,  a l l  of u s  who t a lked  about i t  i n  concer t ,  t h a t  t h a t  
kind of t h ing  lasts j u s t  about t h e  l eng th  of t i m e  i t  t akes  him t o  walk o u t  
t h e  door i f  you pu t  t h a t  much i n t o  a program. W e  f e l t  t h a t  w e  were teaching 
b e t t e r  management of t h e  f l i g h t  by s e l e c t i n g  those  k inds  of t h ings  which, i f  
improperly managed, could be ca t a s t roph ic .  For in s t ance ,  one of t h e  
scena r ios  is  an  engine explosion t h a t  throws p i eces  through t h e  c e n t e r  
engine; as a r e s u l t ,  you are on one engine about a 100 m i l e s  from P i t t sbu rgh .  
Engine f a i l u r e  a t  V-1 i n  t h e  case 
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There i t  is ,  100 m i l e s  away, you can see i t ,  what do you do? 
looking a t  s i n g l e  engine d r i f t  down. W e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  l eng th  of t i m e  t h a t  
w e  exposed t h e  people t o  t h a t  problem w a s  f a r  more b e n e f i c i a l  than  running 
them through t h r e e  an t i - i c ing  e x e r c i s e s  perhaps.  But t h a t  a n t i - i c i n g  
exe rc i se  is  p a r t  of t h e  scenar io .  So w e  covered t h e  k inds  of t h ings  t h a t  
could g e t  you i n  t h e  deepes t  t roub le ,  engine f a i l u r e  a t  VR, t h a t  kind of 
th ing .  W e  f e l t  t h a t  we  should cover r e a l l y  those  th ings  t h a t  would be 
b e n e f i c i a l  t o  t h e  crew r a t h e r  than gyro f a i l u r e  o r  compass f a i l u r e ,  which 
don ' t  r e a l l y  provide a g r e a t  base t o  bu i ld  a t r a i n i n g  problem on. With our  
approach, a l though t h e r e ' s  no pass  o r  f a i l ,  w e  have had t o  t ake  some people  
out  of t h e  program and r e t r a i n  them o r  upgrade t h e i r  t r a i n i n g .  There has  
been no s p e c i f i c  amount of r e t r a i n i n g  t h a t  w e  have had t o  do - it  depends 
on t h e  ind iv idua l .  W e  have had people  come through who can almost walk on 
water, and w e  have some who don ' t  wash. Between those  two i s  t h e  ord inary  
p ick  and shovel  a v i a t o r  l i k e  myself who manages t o  stumble through it  every 
t i m e .  So w e  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  program r e a l l y  hadn ' t  caused us  any e x t r a  
t r a i n i n g  a t  a l l  except f o r  those few who r e a l l y  need i t ,  and they would be 
t h e  ones who would probably f a i l  t h e  PIC check o r  t he  semiannual check 
anyway. So t h e r e  has been no t r a i n i n g  generated i n  excess of what w e  
o r d i n a r i l y  do. I hope t h a t  answers your ques t ion .  
O r  you ' re  
MR. SMITH, ALPA: Has t h i s  had any e f f e c t  on your i n s t r u c t o r s  i n  
terms of what t h e y ' r e  requi red  t o  know and t o  be a b l e  t o  t ransmi t  i n  terms 
of information? How do you f e e l  t h i s  has  a f f e c t e d  s t anda rd iza t ion  of 
procedures under emergency s i t u a t i o n s ?  
CAPT. BEACH: The e f f e c t  on i n s t r u c t o r s  has been cons iderable  
because when w e  f i r s t  pu t  t h e  program toge the r ,  i t  w a s  incumbent upon us  t o  
be s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n s t r u c t o r  conducting t h e  program, which i s  r e a l l y  an  
eva lua t ion ,  knows what h e ' s  doing. 
It is, as probably you have ga thered ,  q u i t e  s u b j e c t i v e  i n  scope. 
Whether t h e  man is good, bad, o r  i n d i f f e r e n t  depends e n t i r e l y  on how t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r  f e e l s .  So w e  have,  I won't say  r i g i d ,  bu t  r a t h e r  comprehensive 
b r i e f i n g s  among t h e  i n s t r u c t o r s  who are LOFT q u a l i f i e d  and myself ,  about 
what t h e  program is  about .  I n  our  handout, t h e  s c r i p t  w e  g ive  t o  t h e  
i n s t r u c t o r s  t o  u s e  is a foreword t h a t  g ives  my ideas  of what l ine-or ien ted  
f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  is  and what t h e  i n s t r u c t o r ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are, and w e  
d i s c u s s  those  when he comes i n  t o  t a l k  t o  m e  before  h e ' s  LOFT-qualified. 
It hinges very  much on t h e  i n s t r u c t o r ,  and h e ' s  very  much aware of t he  f a c t  
t h a t  t h a t ' s  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  and w e  t r a i n  him f o r  t h a t .  
MR. SMITH: But i n  t h e  s t anda rd iza t ion  of t h e  emergency pro- 
cedures ,  has  t h e r e  been any problem i n  t e r m s  of t h e  i n s t r u c t o r s '  
techniques t o  s o l v e  a problem? 
CAPT. BEACH: No, t h e r e  i s  no ind iv idua l  opinion i n  t h e  l i n e -  
o r i en ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  as w e  cons t ruc ted  i t .  The emergencies are handled 
according t o  t h e  s tandard  procedures  as s p e l l e d  out  i n  t h e  a i r p l a n e  f l i g h t  
manual. That doesn ' t  mean t o  say t h e  c a p t a i n  c a n ' t  u se  whatever s o l u t i o n  
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he  f e e l s  b e s t ,  bu t  i n  d e b r i e f i n g  he should be prepared t o  defend it. I f  you 
d e v i a t e  from s tandard  procedure,  w e  expect you t o  say  why. One b e n e f i t  of 
t h e  LOFT program w e  f e e l  may be t h a t  i f  w e  f i n d  your procedure is  b e t t e r  
than t h e  one we  have w r i t t e n ,  w e  may change t h e  one w e  have w r i t t e n .  W e  
haven ' t  y e t ,  though. 
CAPT. FRINK: The t r a i n i n g  committee requested of t h e  FAA, when 
they w e r e  cons ider ing  t h i s  r egu la to ry  change, t h a t  they change t h e  t i m e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  LOFT t o  3 hours f o r  t h e  scena r ios  and a l low us  1 hour 
remaining t o  do s p e c i f i c  maneuver p r a c t i c e  t h a t  may be a seasonal  th ing .  W e  
might want w e t  runways, i c y  runways, w e  might want crosswinds,  w e  might n o t  
want wind shea r ,  something of t h i s  na ture .  But w e  f e l t  a ve ry  g r e a t  need 
t o  be a b l e  t o  have some t i m e  t o  concent ra te  once a year  on s p e c i f i c  needs 
t h a t  t h e  ope ra t ions  has ind ica t ed  are t h e r e .  I n  your opin ion ,  having used 
t h e  LOFT t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  you have, would a 3-hour per iod be adequate  t o  
do t h e  job  t h a t  you ' re  t r y i n g  t o  do? 
CAPT. BEACH: A 3-hour per iod aga in  would depend on what kinds of 
t h ings  you want t o  see. Our ope ra t iona l  requirements ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  
a i r p l a n e s  I ' m  involved wi th ,  are un l ike  yours .  
probably looking a t ,  where maybe you g e t  one landing a day, doesn ' t  apply 
t o  us .  So you would perhaps need t h a t  e x t r a  per iod t o  focus on t h e  kinds of 
t h ings  you f e e l  t h e  crew may no t  o r d i n a r i l y  g e t  t o  see. Because of t h e  way 
w e ' r e  opera t ing  and t h e  kinds of a i r p l a n e s  and r o u t e  s t r u c t u r e  w e  have, w e  
e l ec t ed  t o  go t h e  f u l l  4 hours f o r  l ine-or ien ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  and have 
t h r e e  l e g s  t o  develop t h e  kinds of t h ings  w e  wanted t o  see. Can you do it  
i n  two? Y e s ,  I th ink  you can. You would have t o  s i t  down wi th  t h e  people 
who are going t o  cons t ruc t  t he  program and dec ide  your p r i o r i t i e s  and then 
cons t ruc t  3 hours based on what you f e e l  is r e a l l y  important ,  which i s  what 
w e  r e a l l y  d i d  f o r  4 hours.  
The s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  you are 
MR. COEN: 1 would l i k e  t o  suggest  t h a t  maybe we  ought t o  have a 
t r a i n i n g  committee meeting. 
of t h e  carriers have i s  nothing bu t  a race through a l l  of t h e  maneuvers of 
Appendix E. Now, when you g e t  i n t o  LOFT, i t ' s  Appendix E t r a i n i n g  i n  a 
l o g i c a l  sequence, i n  a r e a l i s t i c  sense.  And t h e  grading o r  t h e  p a s s - f a i l  
s i t u a t i o n  is  no d i f f e r e n t  f o r  LOFT t r a i n i n g  than  i t  is  f o r  409 t r a i n i n g ,  
us ing  a l l  of Appendix E i n s t ead  of l i n e  check. So t h e r e  is r e a l l y  no g r e a t  
change i n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  t h a t  would be r equ i r ed  t o  b r ing  a man up t o  
a s tandard  i f  he i n  f a c t  w a s  no t .  I don ' t  know how many carriers are us ing  
it ,  bu t  t h e r e  are many. So t h e r e  is  no real g r e a t  change here .  
The 409 t r a i n i n g  p resen t ly  i n  t h e  book t h a t  a l o t  
The o t h e r  t h ing  i s  t h a t  t h e  LOFT t r a i n i n g  program, a t  t h e  recommendation 
of t h e  t r a i n i n g  committee, r e q u i r e s  a minimum of 3 hours  and 20 minutes and 
t h e  o the r  40 minutes are t h e r e  f o r  such th ings  as wind shear  and w h a t  have 
you. 
CAPT. BEACH: Every a i r l i n e  has  i t s  own f l a v o r ,  I be l i eve ,  based 
But I t h i n k  i f  you adopt  a 
on t h e  k inds  of t h ings  t h a t  you f e e l  you need f o r  ope ra t iona l  requirements .  
Ours may taste d i f f e r e n t l y  from yours .  
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l ine-or ien ted  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  program t h a t  s u i t s  your needs i t  probably 
won't be d i f f e r e n t  completely from my own, bu t  w i l l  be  every b i t  as good f o r  
t h e  kind of t r a i n i n g  you need t o  do from your p a r t i c u l a r  po in t  of view. 
DR. LAUBER: Thank you, B e r t .  I ' d  l i k e  t o  underscore a couple  of 
t h ings  t h a t  B e r t  brought ou t  and Capt. Holdstock brought up. One of t h e  
th ings  t h a t  Tom Nunn d i d  up a t  Northwest w a s  t o  adminis te r  a ques t ionnai re  
t o  people who had gone through h i s  program t o  g e t  some idea  of what t h e i r  
i deas  and impressions were about t h e  program. Tom provided those  d a t a  t o  
us ,  and w e  analyzed them i n  an  at tempt  t o  f i n d  o u t  what people who had been 
through t h e  program thought they learned  about  i t .  There are a couple  of 
s e l e c t e d  comments t h a t  w e  go t  back t h a t  I t h i n k  r e a l l y  speak f o r  themselves. 
These are d i r e c t  quota t ions .  
"Judgment i n  f l y i n g  can be descr ibed  as t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p l ace  r e l a t i v e  
importance on many v a r i a b l e s  whi le  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s .  LOFT a l lows  t h e  
ind iv idua l  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  judgment . I '  
Another comment, "LOFT o f f e r s  t h e  chance t o  t ake  a s i t u a t i o n  t o  i t s  
conclusion r e g a r d l e s s  of whether t h e  procedure s e l e c t e d  w a s  good o r  bad. 
f o r c e s  them t o  c a r r y  through wi th  a series of a c t i o n s  and f o r c e s  them t o  
t h i n k  about it . I '  
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Another one, "It w a s  a real  eye-opener t o  see a crew l o s e  i t s  co- 
o rd ina t ion .  It brought ou t  two th ings  t o  m e .  One, t h e r e ' s  a heavy load on 
t h e  second o f f i c e r  dur ing  emergencies and two, t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  d e l i b e r a t i o n  
before  t ak ing  a c t i o n .  You must t h i n k  about t h e  consequences of every ac t ion . "  
I t h i n k  these  are some i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  i n s i g h t  t h a t  people  g e t  i n t o  
t h e i r  own behavior when they  go through t h i s .  Two f i n a l  ones. 
One, "This program should make a few maverick l o n e r s  r e a l i z e  how much 
w e  need coord ina t ion  wi th in  t h e  cockpi t . "  
And t h e  f i n a l  one: t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  learned  "How easy i t  w a s  t o  compound 
ignorance wi th  damned fool i shness ."  
118 
